Imagine yourself as a matchmaker with female clients, denoted by the set [A, B, C, D], and male clients, denoted by the set [a, b, c, d]. You are tasked to arrange 4 stable es of the maidens listed in order of Massachusetts dating site preference, and each woman similarly ranks the men. A marriage ( M ) is deemed stable when there are no dissatisfied pairs. For the couples a-D and b-C, if man D prefers woman b (the wife of another man) AND woman b also favors man D to C, both marriages will soon collapse. A duo is only unstable if both D and b choose to forgo their current mates for each other. If man D admires woman b, but she does not reciprocate, no dissatisfied pair is created - unrequited extramarital affection will still result in stable sets .
In the pair a-A, man a is delighted because woman A is his optimal wife. However, woman A may still pursue better options, such as men d or c. If both d and c would be more satisfied with A than their existing partners, A will prioritize d. Yet if man d is uninterested but man c is happy to oblige, c-A will emerge as a new stable pair
Men will propose to their next most desired mate at each subsequent iteration. Ladies accepting bids have the opportunity to “up-change” for a better partner, making this a greedy algorithm for women. This female-serving feature is not a flaw in the program, but a factor that reflects reality: the proportion of male-to-female is on Tinder, and the Bumble app only permits women to message first (sorry, gentlemen) . Participants that are in less “demand” in the aggregate market (frequently positioned at the lower range of other suitors' lists) will have to endure more reiterations before exiting the loop of possible rejection. As comedian Matt Moore sardonically puts it: “It's a new way to get rejected – Mathematics!” .
Is online dating a numbers game?
Algorithms such as the Elo-score and Gale-Shapley theory have expedited matchmaking with a sizable pool of potential partners.